Reconciling Bayesian Epistemology and Narration-based Approaches to
  Judiciary Fact-finding by Urbaniak, Rafal
J. Lang (Ed.): TARK 2017
EPTCS 251, 2017, pp. 504–514, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.251.37
c© R. Urbaniak
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License.
Reconciling Bayesian Epistemology and Narration-based
Approaches to Judiciary Fact-finding
Rafal Urbaniak
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Belgium∗
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Poland†
rfl.urbaniak@gmail.com
Legal probabilism (LP) claims the degrees of conviction in juridical fact-finding are to be modeled
exactly the way degrees of beliefs are modeled in standard bayesian epistemology. Classical legal
probabilism (CLP) adds that the conviction is justified if the credence in guilt given the evidence
is above an appropriate guilt probability threshold. The views are challenged on various counts,
especially by the proponents of the so-called narrative approach, on which the fact-finders’ decision
is the result of a dynamic interplay between competing narratives of what happened. I develop a
way a bayesian epistemologist can make sense of the narrative approach. I do so by formulating a
probabilistic framework for evaluating competing narrations in terms of formal explications of the
informal evaluation criteria used in the narrative approach.1
1 Legal probabilism and its troubles
According to legal probabilism (LP), degrees of conviction in juridical fact-finding are to be modeled
exactly the way degrees of beliefs are modeled in standard bayesian epistemology: by means of prob-
abilistic distributions satisfying the standard axioms of probability theory. Classical legal probabilism
(CLP), which originated with Bernoulli [3] adds on top of that the view according to which the criminal
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt should be equated with a certain high threshold probability
of guilt (albeit, some variants of the view admit that thresholds for different cases might be different).2
LP (and generally, the use of probabilistic methods in judiciary contexts) is criticized from various
angles (see for example [18], [19], [4], [20], [14], [5], [6], [21], [17], [2], [10], [9]). The critics of
LP argue that the view is blind to various phenomena that an adequate philosophical account of legal
fact-finding should explain. Some of them pertain to procedural issues [17]: proceedings are back-and-
forth between opposing parties, cross-examination is crucial, and yet CLP seems to take no notice of
this dynamics. Some have to do with reasoning methods which are not only evidence-to-hypothesis, but
also hypotheses-to-evidence [21, 2] and involve inference to the best explanation [6]. A better account,
arguably, is one in which the proceedings are seen as an interplay of evidence and various explanations
(often called narratives) presented by opposing parties [10].
Accordingly, the no plausible alternative story (NPAS) theory [1] is that the courtroom is a con-
frontation of competing narrations offered by the defendant and by the prosecutor and the narrative to be
selected should be the most plausible one. The view is conceptually plausible [7] and finds support in
∗The research has been funded by Research Foundation Flanders.
†The research was supported by National Centre for Science grant number 2016/22/E/HS1/00304.
1Due to the nature of this volume and space restrictions, this paper focuses mostly on presenting the technical apparatus.
Deeper philosophical discussion, application to examples, and further informal clarifications are postponed to a different,
lengthy paper.
2Nowadays, legal scholars fond of probabilism usually inscribe to LP but not to CLP.
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psychological evidence [16, 15]. The approach is also better at capturing the already listed phenomena
that CLP is claimed to be blind to.
From the perspective of a formal epistemologist, the key disadvantage of NPAS is that it abandons
the rich toolbox of probabilistic methods and takes the key notion of plausibility to be a primitive notion
which should be intuitively understood.3 The goal of this paper is to develop a bayesian approach to
NPAS, showing that one can embrace NPAS without giving up on probabilistic methods.
2 Classical legal probabilism and the gatecrasher paradox
CLP is also susceptible to criticism directed at its specific claim: that there is a guilt probability threshold.
One of the most well-known conceptual arguments against the idea is the following.
The paradox of the gatecrasher [4]4 has been developed to indicate that mere high probability of
guilt is not enough for a conviction. A variant of the paradox goes as follows:
Suppose our guilt threshold is high, say at 0.99. Consider the situation in which 1000 fans
enter a football stadium, and 999 of them avoid paying for their tickets. A random spectator
is tried for not paying. The probability that the spectator under trial did not pay exceeds
0.99. Yet, intuitively, a spectator cannot be considered guilty on the sole basis of the number
of people who did and did not pay.
CLP fails to handle the gatecrasher paradox: whatever 6= 1 threshold you propose, I can give you a
variant of the gatecrasher with sufficiently many people for the guilt statement of an arbitrary spectator
to be above the guilt threshold.
NPAS, on the other hand, seems to avoid the paradox: conviction of a random attendee is unjustified,
because there is no real plausible story of guilt of that particular person. After all, merely quoting the
statistics, on this approach, hardly counts as giving a narrative. The problem is, such considerations are
left at an informal level, the requirements on what should count as a narration aren’t too clear, and so the
considerations remain somewhat indecisive. After all, a stubborn philosopher might still insist: look, all
that is needed is a theory of what happened that is more plausible than the alternative — my theory is,
the suspect is guilty, and, given the evidence, it is more plausible than the alternative, which says that he
isn’t.
3 New legal probabilism
New legal probabilism (NLP) is an attempt to improve on the underspecificity of NPAS [7]. While still
being informal, the approach is more specific about the conditions that a successful accusing narration
is to satisfy for the conviction beyond reasonable doubt to be justified. Di Bello identifies four key
requirements.
3“I have been asked to elaborate on the meaning of plausibility in this theoretical structure. The difficulty in doing so is that
the relative plausibility theory is a positive rather than a normative theory. For reasons I will elaborate below, plausibility can
serve as a primitive theoretical term the meaning of which is determined by its context in the explanation of trials.” [1, p. 10]
4It is analogous the prisoners in a yard scenario [14], where a group of prisoners commits a group killing, and it’s impossible
to identify the single innocent prisoner. Mathematically, the examples are pretty much the same.
506 Bayesian Epistemology and Narratives
(Evidential support) The defendant’s guilt probability on the evidence
should be sufficiently supported by the evidence, and
a successful accusing narration should explain the rele-
vant evidence.
(Evidential completeness) The evidence available at trial should be complete as
far as a reasonable fact-finders’ expectations are con-
cerned.
(Resiliency) The prosecutor’s narrative, based on the available evi-
dence, should not be susceptible to revision given rea-
sonably possible future arguments and evidence.
(Narrativity) The narrative offered by the prosecutor should answer
all the natural or reasonable questions one may have
about what happened, given the content of the prosecu-
tor’s narration and the available evidence.
How would NLP handle the gatecrasher? Di Bello’s discusses an analogous prisoners scenario,
in which a footage indicates that all but one prisoners participated in a group killing, but the footage
doesn’t allow for identification of the innocent prisoner [7, pp. 219-222]. He argues that the conviction
is unjustified on two counts. First, the narrative is grossly incomplete: “What is the initiating event?
What psychological responses did it trigger? Who participated in the killing? What were the different
participants doing?. . . ” Second, the convicting scenario, Di Bello argues, isn’t resilient, for it is quite
plausible that more evidence might become available.
Unfortunately, it is not quite clear whether the resources that NLP helps herself to when formulating
the requirements, indeed fall into the realm of bayesian methodology:
The probabilists can enrich their framework by adding probability-based accounts of evi-
dential completeness, resiliency, and narrativity. To my knowledge, no legal probabilist has
undertaken the task in any systematic way. [7, p. 75]
In what follows we undertake this task.
4 Preliminary technicalities
4.1 The language and its interpretation
The object language is a standard propositional language L (I assume ∧ and ¬ are the primitive connec-
tives, nothing serious hinges on the choice) extended to a language L + with primitive unary operators
E,NA1 , . . . ,N
A
k , N
D
1 , . . . ,N
D
k , and the guilt statement constant G.
The content of the guilt statement is given in terms of a list of conditions in the background language
that need to be established for a conviction to be justified. This is modeled by conditioning on the
definition of guilt G which has the form of G≡ g1∧ ·· ·∧gl for appropriate g1, . . . ,gl ∈L .
The intended interpretation of Ep is p is part of evidence. The idea is that after all the evidence and
all the arguments have been presented in court, the background knowledge is to be enriched by the pieces
of evidence presented, thought of as sentences of L : E = {e1, . . . ,e j} ⊂ L . However, we are not only
to extend our beliefs by e1, . . . ,e j, but also by the corresponding claims about these sentences being part
of evidence: Ee1, . . . ,Ee j.
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NAi p means p is part of an accusing narration N
A
i and N
D
i p means p is part of a defending narration
NDi . Each narration Ni (in contexts in which it is irrelevant whether a narration is an accusing one or not,
I will suppress the superscripts) is taken to be a finite set of sentences ni1,ni2, . . . ,niki of L
+.
E stands ambiguously for the set of all sentences constituting evidence and for the conjunction
thereof. Which reading is meant will always be clear from the context (this convention applies to all finite
sets of sentences considered in this paper). Ed stands for Ed = {Eϕ |ϕ ∈ E} and E− is {¬Eϕ |ϕ 6∈ E}. The
distinction is needed, because there is a difference between knowing that certain sentences are pieces of
evidence, and knowing that no other sentence is. For any narration Ni, symbols Ni, N
d
i , and N
−
i are to be
understood analogously to E, Ed and E−. Nd is the (positive) description of all the narrations,
⋃
iN
d
i , and
N−=
⋃
i N
−
i adds that this description is complete.
4.2 Partial probability and four thresholds
The current framework diverges from the standard bayesianism in using partial probability functions
rather than full probabilistic discributions to model credences. This is motivated by noticing that the fact-
finders, on one hand, are supposed to rely on their background knowledge when assessing the plausibility
of a given narration, but on the other hand, they clearly cannot rely on all biases and assumptions that
they have.5
A partial conditional credence function P (partially) maps L +×P(L +) to [0,1].6 (I often write
P(h|E) instead of P(〈h,E〉)). Let ↓ and ↑ stand for being defined and being undefined respectively. A
partial probability distribution has to have an extension to a total conditional probability distribution over
L + satisfying the standard axioms of conditional probability, Moreover, it additionally has to satisfy the
following conditions for any Γ ⊆L +, and any ϕ ,ψ ∈L +:
P(⊤|Γ) = 1 P(⊥|Γ) = 0 (Part-1)
ϕ ∈ Γ ⇒ P(ϕ |Γ) ↓ (Part-2)
P(ϕ |Γ) ↓ ⇔ P(¬ϕ |Γ) ↓ P(ϕ ∧ψ |Γ) ↓ ⇔ P(ψ ∧ϕ |Γ) ↓ (Part-3)
P(ϕ ∧ψ |Γ)> 0⇒ P(ϕ |Γ) ↓,P(ψ , |Γ) ↓ P(ϕ |Γ) = 0⇒ P(ϕ ∧ψ |Γ) ↓ (Part-4)
P(ϕ |Γ) ↑ ⇒ P(ϕ ∧ψ |Γ) ↑ unless P(ψ |Γ) = 0 (Part-5)
If P(ϕ |Γ)> 0,P(ϕ ∧ψ |Γ) = 0, then P(ψ |Γ) = 0 (Part-6)
(Part-1) requires that logical truths have probability 1 and logical contradictions always have proba-
bility 0. (Part-2) requires that the probability of a claim given a set of premises that includes it is always
defined. (Part-3) states that the conditional probability of a claim is defined just in case the conditional
probability of its negation is, and that the order of conjuncts has no impact on whether the conditional
probability of a conjunction is defined. According to (Part-4), the conditional non-zero probability of a
conjunction is defined only if the conditional probability of both conjuncts is. Moreover, if the condi-
tional probability of a conjunct is 0, the conditional probability of the conjunction is defined (and by the
fact that the credence has an extension to a total conditional probability satisfying the standard axioms,
we also know that it will be 0 as well). (Part-5) says that, unless this unusual circumstance occurs, the
5Suspending our conviction about p cannot be easily modeled in the standard bayesian framework, since even the most
sensible candidate, 1/2, doesn’t do the job. Just to give a simple example, there is a difference between knowing that a given
coin is fair and assigning probability of 1/2 to heads, and not knowing how fair a coin is at all and assigning probability of 1/2
to heads for this reason.
6Partial credence functions for conditional probabilities have been introduced in [13] and [12]; my definition differs from
that account in a few inessential aspects.
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conditional probability of a conjunction is undefined if the conditional probability of at least one conjunct
is. Finally, (Part-6) demands that if a conjunct has a conditional probability > 0, then the conjunction
has conditional probability 0 only if the other conjunct does.
Since the fact-finders are supposed not to be biased and aren’t informed about the trial yet, we addi-
tionally assume that the priors of guilt, of what the evidence and what the narrations are, are undefined:
P(G) ↑, P(g1∧ ·· ·∧gl) ↑, P(Eϕ) ↑,P(Niϕ) ↑ for any ϕ ∈L
+, and any 1< i< k.
Four types of stances that a fact-finder might take towards a claim will be considered. First, a fact-
finder might consider a claim completely uncontroversial, and accept it without any further argument.
Such stance will be modeled by the credence in a given claim reaching the uncontroversial acceptability
threshold, a. On the opposite side of spectrum we have the negligibility threshold, n =d f 1− a. Notice
that a and n can’t be respectively 1 and 0, for this would require complete unrevisable certainty.
One more type of stance needs to be incorporated into the framework — that of strong plausibility.
Usually there are claims that are strongly supported while not being as close to certainty as the uncontro-
versially acceptable ones. This kind of credence that we would normally find sufficient for acting upon in
our uncertain world will be denoted by s. The opposite will be called rejectability, r=d f 1−s. Clearly
we should require a> s> r> n.
4.3 Information and updates
After all the evidence and all the arguments have been presented in court, the background knowledge
obtained now consists of the pieces of evidence presented, E, information about what is not part of
evidence, E−, the content of the guilt statement G, and the description of the content of a certain finite
assembly of finite theories meant to defend or accuse the defendant, ND1 , . . . ,N
D
k ,N
A
1 ,N
A
m (and what is not
part of which narration). When making various assessments in the fact-finding process, at various stages
one needs to conditionalize on various parts of the available information, depending on what is being
assessed. The variants used are listed in the table below.
name notation meaning
full P f (ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|E,Ed ,E−,Nd ,N−,G,Γ)
n-full Pn f (ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|E,Ed ,Nd ,N−,G,Γ)
informed Pi(ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|E,Ed ,Nd ,G,Γ)
evidential Pe(ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|E,Ed ,E−,G,Γ)
argued Pa(ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|Nd ,G,Γ)
play-along PN j(ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|N j,N
d ,N−,G,Γ)
n-extended play-along PnN j(ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|N j,E,E
d ,Nd ,N−,G,Γ)
e-extended play-along PeN j(ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|N j,E,E
d ,E−,Nd ,G,Γ)
f-extended play-along P fN j (ϕ|Γ) P(ϕ|N j,E,E
d ,E−,Nd ,N−,G,Γ)
5 Defining conditions on a set of narrations
Think of N as the set of attacking and defending narrations seriously considered in the fact-finding pro-
cess. In this section I list some basic conditions on a set of sets of sentences to count as a set of narration.
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In the next section, I explicate the requirements used in the evaluation of narrations.
P f (¬(Ni∧N j))≥ a, for i 6= j (Exclusion)
P fN
A
i (G)≥ a∧P fN
D
k (¬G)≥ a (Decision)
Pe(Nk)≥ n (Initial plausibility)
P f (N1∨ ·· ·∨Nk)≥ s (Exhaustion)
(Exclusion) requires that narrations under consideration should pairwise exclude each other given
what we know about the case. According to (Decision), a defense narration should clearly state that,
given all that is known, the accused is not guilty, and an accusing narration should clearly state that,
given all that is known, they are. (Initial plausibility) says that we shouldn’t consider narrations that are
uncontroversially excluded by sensible background knowledge or by evidence. (Exhaustion) requires
that it should be strongly plausible that at least one of the narrations hold, given all that we know about
the case.
6 Evaluation criteria
Explaining evidence. Now we’re ready to look at the explication of the criteria involved in the eval-
uation of competing narratives. Let’s start with the requirement that they should explain the evidence.
After all the narrations have been presented and deployed, an accusing narration NAi should “make sense”
of evidence in the following sense. For any item of evidence presented, e, if, according to NAi , it is not
excluded as evidence, it should be strongly plausible given NAi .
For any e ∈ E, [¬PN
A
i (¬Ee)≥ s⇒ PN
A
i (e)≥ s] (Explaining evidence A)
The sense in which a defending narration is supposed to explain evidence is somewhat different.
After all, if the defense story is rather minimal and mostly constitutes in rebutting the accusations, it
isn’t reasonable to expect the defense to explain all pieces of evidence, as long as they aren’t really
used to support the opposing accusing narration. Rather, the defense should argue that the possibility of
the evidence being as it is while the defense’s narration is true hasn’t been rejected. Thus, we put the
condition on a defending narration NDk as follows:
For any e ∈ E, if there is NAi (Explaining evidence D)
such that P(NAi |e)> P(N
A
i ),
then PN
D
k (e)≥ r.
Missing evidence. The intuition here is that sometimes, given the narration and whatever evidence we
already have, certain evidence should be available, but it isn’t. For instance, in a drunk driving case the
fact-finders would naturally expect a breathalyzer result, and in a murder case evidence as to how the
victim was killed is needed.
ME(Ni)⇔ for some ϕ1, . . . ,ϕu 6∈ E : (Missing evidence)
[PnNi(E(ϕ1)∨ ·· ·∨E(ϕu))≥ s]
The disjunction above is there to ensure generality: it might be the case that some evidence from
among a group of possible pieces of evidence would be needed, without any particular piece of evidence
being expected.
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Gaps. Sometimes a narration should be more specific, given what it says and what we already know.
For instance, an accusing narration might be required to specify how the victim was attacked, or a
defending narration should specify where the defendant was at the time of the crime. Accordingly,
we say that Ni is gappy (G(Ni)) just in case there are claims that the narration should choose from and
yet it doesn’t:
G(Ni)⇔ for some ϕ1, . . . ,ϕu 6∈ Ni (Gap)
P fNi(ϕ1∨ ·· ·∨ϕu)≥ s∧
PeNi(Ni(ϕ1)∨ ·· ·∨Ni(ϕu))≥ s
Dominating accusing narration. An accusing narration NAi dominates the set of all accusing narra-
tions NA just in case it doesn’t miss any evidence, it doesn’t contain any gap, in light of all available
information and evidence it is at least as likely any other accusing narration, and it is strongly plausible,
given all available information:
D(NAi )⇔¬ME(N
A
i )∧¬G(N
A
i )∧ (Domination)
P f (NAi )≥ P
f (NAj ) for all j 6= i∧
P f (NAi )≥ s
Resiliency. A dominating narration NAi is resilient (R(N
A
i )) just in case there is no non-negligible po-
tential evidence that might undermine it, at least in light of all we know (minus the negative description
of the evidence, to avoid triviality) — that is, no ϕ with Pn f (Eϕ)≥ n – such that if E was modified to
E∪{ϕ}, NAi would no longer dominate.
Conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A defense narration NDk raises reasonable doubt (RD(N
D
k )) if it
has no gaps, and hasn’t been rejected given all that we know:
RD(NDk )⇔¬G(N
D
k )∧P
f (NDk )≥ r (Reasonable doubt)
Accordingly, we say that a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt if it is justified by a resilient dominating
narration and no defense narration raises reasonable doubt.
7 Looking at the gatecrasher paradox
Once we’ve formulated the framework, it will be instructive to use it to look at the gatecrasher paradox,
and to observe how the requirements and distinctions introduced help us obtain better insight.
Let’s creatively call the suspects 1, 2, 3, . . . , 1000. Consider the situation in which the accusing
narration is simply 1 gatecrashed, g1, and the defending narration is simply 1 didn’t gatecrash, ¬g1.
Suppose we have P(g1|e) = 999/1000 and P(¬g1|e) = 1/1000.
Variant 1 NA = g1, N
D = ¬g1.
One might try to counter this formulation with the following strategy:
Strategy 1: Extreme thresholds Take P f (·) to be P(·|e), and claim r < 1/1000
and s> 999/1000.
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The strategy isn’t too successful, though — it’s ad hoc and it isn’t immune to other versions of the
paradox, where the number of people is tweaked to get the guilt probability threshold about whatever
threshold was picked in Strategy 1. Perhaps, a better approach would be this:
Strategy 2: Full credence vs. statistics Take P f (·) to not be P(·|e), and claim P f (g1) is
insufficiently high.
Perhaps there is something to saying that the posterior credences don’t have to match the statistical
probabilities (as Kaye [11] suggests). But merely saying so doesn’t provide a principled explanation: the
fact that we’re not inclined to accept a claim that has high statistical probability is the explanandum, not
the explanans.
Strategy 3: realistic gaps and non-resiliency There are multiple natural questions that the
accusing narration fails to answer; it also fails
to ensure that no future evidence is likely
which might overturn the decision.
This is, pretty much, the strategy pursued in [7]. While it is a perfectly valid strategy if the question
is how a case like gatecrasher would be handled in reality, this is not the end of the story.
The gatecrasher, or at least a variant thereof, can be viewed rather as an abstract thought experiment
formulated to make a conceptual point. And when a philosopher formulates an abstract thought experi-
ment, they’re free to set it up any way they want, without too much attention paid to the level of realism,
as long as appropriate conceptual restraints are satisfied.
In particular, one might simply make it part of the description of the situation that no further evidence
can be obtained despite everyone’s best attempts, and no realistic considerations about further details can
play a role. No witnesses can come and testify as to the character of 1, because he’s been living under a
rock and knows nobody. No question about the exact location is natural, because the stadium is somewhat
unusual in having no gates, and in fact the 999 people who didn’t pay for tickets jumped the fence, in an
evenly distributed manner. No surveillance was possible because an accident in the local atomic plant
fried all electronics in the area, etc. Call such a variant of the paradox abstract gatecrasher.
The question now is: putting the issues with realism and supposing the abstract gatecrasher is immune
to these, can we think of more purely epistemic or deontic reasons why the accusing narration in the
abstract gatecrasher is not sufficient for a conviction beyond reasonable doubt?
One issue that may come to mind even from a more abstract perspective, is that it doesn’t seem that
the accusing narration N1 = g1 explains the evidence.
Strategy 5: Unexplained evidence The narration relies on e without entailing that it
shouldn’t be evidence, and yet PN1(e) 6≥ s.
The mere fact that 1 decided to gatecrash, while suggesting that he might’ve done it with a bunch of
friends, certainly doesn’t make the claim that so did other 998 people strongly plausible.
This, however, can be fairly easily fixed by modifying the accusing narration to 1 gatecrashed, and
so did 998 other people. This, formally comes to using
Variant 2 N′1 = {g1,e}
Indeed, the mere fact that 1 decided to gatecrash, while suggesting that he might’ve done it with a bunch
of friends, certainly doesn’t make the claim that so did other 998 people strongly plausible. Quite clearly,
PN1(e|N′1) ≥ s, and so Strategy 5 doesn’t beat the paradox with this narration as the accusing narration.
Can we do any better?
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8 Epistemological commitment issues
Imagine the sides have the following exchange:
Defense: So you claim that the suspect is responsible for the damage?
Persecution: Yes.
D: And you agree that the claim that the sidewalk was unusually
slippery that day due to an oil truck failure is at least as likely as
that the suspect is responsible?
P: Of course.
D: And, given that you’re accusing my client, you think you’re in
position to claim you know he is responsible, correct?
P: Yes, that’s correct.
D: Are you not, then, in position to know that the sidewalk was un-
usually slippery that day due to an oil truck failure?
P: . . .
I hope the reader shares the intuition that responding “no” to the above question would be a sign of
a serious cognitive failure. In general, it seems that we’d normally expect the persecution to accept any
claim relevant to the case that, given the evidence and the persecution’s narration, is at least as likely as
the guilt statement that they’re putting forward. This motivates the following requirement:
(Commitment) For any ϕ relevant to the case, if P fN
A
i (ϕ) ≥ P fN
A
i (G), then
PeNi(Ni(ϕ))≥ s.
If the reader prefers to do so, we might leave the notion of relevance at the intuitivel level. We
don’t have to though — it could be explicated along the following lines. First, a set of sentences is
relevant for the case if it is consistent with the background knowledge and there is a narration such
that its posterior probability given all background knowledge together with that set is different from its
posterior probability given all background knowledge only. A set of sentences is a minimal relevant set
if no proper subset thereof is a relevant set. A sentence is relevant if it or its negation is a member of a
minimal relevant subset.
Now, how does (Commitment) apply to the gatecrasher? Take any gi where i 6= 1. Consider an
argument analogous to the previous one:
Defense: So you claim that 1 is guilty?
Persecution: Yes.
D: And you agree 2 is at least as likely to be guilty as 1?
P: Of course.
D: So you’re in position to claim you know 1 is guilty, correct?
P: Yes, that’s correct.
D: Are you not, then, in position to know that 2 is guilty as
well?
P: . . .
Again, it seems that the negative answer to the above question would be irrational. (If you worry
about gi being relevant, wait for the development of the argument.)
Observe now that in the case of the gatecrasher, the accusing narration already discussed, N′1 is in the
somewhat unusual lottery-paradox-like situation that given all that is known (and the narration itself) any
other suspect is at least as likely to be guilty as suspect 1.
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Now we can run the argument to the effect that N′1 fails to satisfy conditions for conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Given the relevance of all gi (i 6= 1), (Commitment) entails that for any i 6= 1 we have
PeN
′
1(N′1(gi))≥ s. (Step 1)
Since N′1 is an accusing narration delivering g1, by (Decision) and the fact that a> s we have
P fN
′
1(gi)≥ a> s. (Step 2)
The very description of N′1 entails:
gi 6∈ N
′
1. (Step 3)
Steps (1-3) taken together, however, constitute the defining elements of (Gap) (for the slightly degenerate
case where ϕ1 ∨ ·· · ∨ϕu simply is gi). This means that N
′
1 is gappy, G(N
′
1), and so it fails to justify a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
What happens, on the other hand, if N′1 is replaced with N
+
1 : an accusing narration which results with
taking the least narration containing N′1 and closed under (Commitment) with respect to all gi, i 6= 1, so
that:
N+1 = {g1,e}∪{gk|k 6= 1}? (Bite the bullet)
Then, the resulting narration simply becomes highly implausible: e, and therefore also N+1 , entails that
exactly one person is innocent, but also for each particular suspect u, N+1 insists on u being guilty. Such
a narration doesn’t even satisfy (Initial plausibility), not to mention failing to be a dominating one (for
which strong plausibility is required).
By the way, this is why each gi is relevant: together they change the outcome. This is also the reason
why they’re relevant in the more technical sense: the set of all gis contradicts evidence, while no proper
subset thereof does.
So, to wrap up the discussion of the gatecrasher, in a sense there is no single simple diagnosis of the
gatecrasher, for the following reasons. First of all, there is no single gatecrasher, but two main variants
thereof: a realistic one and a very abstract one.7 Second, some supposed solutions don’t work against
any of them. Third, sometimes there is more than one reason why a variant fails. Four, different variants
can be seen as failing for different reasons (although reasons that apply to the abstract one apply to the
realistic one; it’s just that deploying them to the realistic gatecrasher is an overkill).
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